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Recent Developments

State v. Rucker:
A Brief Investigatory Stop is Not a Restraint on Freedom of Movement
Characteristic of a Formal Arrest and Does Not Require Miranda Warnings

By: Ruthie Linzer

T

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland held a brief
investigatory stop is not a restraint
on freedom of movement characteristic of a formal arrest and does
not require Miranda warnings.
State v. Rucker, 374 Md. 199,821
A.2d 439 (2003). The court of
appeals followed the recent trend
of Supreme Court rulings, which
require formal custody or restraint
on freedom characteristic of a
formal arrest as the ultimate inquiry
in determining whether a suspect is
in custody for Miranda purposes.
Id.
On December 31, 2000, a
confidential informant tipped police
that Terrance Rucker ("Rucker")
was among a number of individuals
involved in narcotics trafficking. A
few days later, the informant
accompanied Detectives Powell and
Piazza to a shopping mall parking
lot where Rucker was indentified as
he went to his car. Powell
immediately instructed Corporal
Grimes to stop Rucker until they
arrived at the scene. Grimes' patrol
car pulled up behind Rucker's
parked car, leaving space in front
of Rucker's car. Grimes asked
Rucker for his license and
registration. Meanwhile, the two
detectives arrived. Detective

Powell asked Rucker, "[ d]o you
have anything you are not supposed
to have?" Rucker replied, "[y]es, I
do, it's in my pocket." Powell asked
what it was and Rucker replied
cocaine, at which point Rucker was
arrested.
The trial court held Rucker
was in custody, had not been read
his Miranda rights, and suppressed
the confession. The State filed an
interlocutory appeal. The court of
special appeals affirmed, holding
although the stop was valid, what
occurred after the stop changed the
character of the event and the stop
became the functional equivalent of
a de facto arrest requiring Miranda
warnings. The court of appeals
granted certiorari.
The court of appeals began its
analysis by noting the first step in
determining whether a Miranda
warning is required is to determine
if the defendant was in custody. ld.
at 208, 821 A.2d at 444. The court
reviewed Miranda s history and
subsequent case law concerning
custodial questioning. ld. Custodial
questioning is "initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way." Id.
(quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384

U.S. 436,444 (1966».
The court of appeals uses a
two-part test to determine whether
a defendant was in custody. Id. at
210, 821 A.2d at 446. First, the
court considers circumstances
surrounding the interrogation. ld.
Second, given those circumstances,
the court considers whether a reasonable person would believe he
or she was at liberty to terminate
the interrogation and leave. Id.
Since Miranda, Supreme Court
rulings added a third and final step
to the inquiry: whether there was a
"formal arrest or restraint on
freedom of movement of the degree
associated with a formal arrest."
Id. at 211,821 A.2d 439,446.
In the case at bar, the court of
appeals held the circumstances of
Rucker's stop brief and investigatory and they remained so when
Rucker told police he had cocaine.
Id. at 212, 821 A.2d at 446.
Rucker was not in custody for
Miranda purposes because he was
not restrained to a degree associated with formal arrest. Id.
Rucker was asked a single question
in a public parking lot, the stop took
less than one hour, and no law enforcement officer drew a weapon.
Id. at 221, 821 A.2d at 452.
Accordingly, Miranda warnings
34.1 U. Bait. L.F. 39
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were not required before police
asked Rucker whether he had
anything illegal. Id
The court of appeals
concluded this particular stop was
not a de facto arrest. Id. at 221,
821 A.2d at 452. The court cited
Berkemer v. McCarty, which considered questioning during a brief
investigatory stop on a public street,
where potential eyewitnesses could
be drawn to the scene, not custodial
for Miranda purposes. Id. (citing
Berkemer, 468 U.S. 420 (1984)).
Such a stop is only considered custodial if it is of a degree associated
with formal arrest or if it develops
into a formal arrest. Id. at 218-19,
821 A.2d at 450.
In addition, the court cited two
Maryland cases that held coercive
circumstances similar to the instant
case were not custodial for Miranda
purposes. In McAvoy v. State, a
suspect's car was pulled over by
police and he was asked to perform
a lengthy field sobriety test, which
he failed. Id. at 220, 821 A.2d at
451 (citing McAvoy, 314 Md. 509,
551 A.2d875 (1989)). Next,in In
re David 8., a suspect was thrown
down and handcuffed when he
appeared to reach for a gun. Id. at
216, 821 A.2d at 449 (citing In re
David, 367 Md. 523, 789 A.2d 607
(2002)). As in Rucker's situation,
each stop was conducted in public,
was brief, and did not lead to formal
arrests for 'Miranda purposes,
despite their seemingly coercive
nature.
The Rucker decision sends a
strong message that despite the
authoritative nature of a brief

34.1 U. Bait L.F. 40

investigatory stop by law enforcement officers, the standard remains
that these types of stops will not
require Miranda warnings unless
the suspect is restrained to a degree
associated with formal arrest or
placed under formal arrest. If a
suspect is restrained to such a
degree, the constitutional right
against being compelled to make
self- incriminating statements comes
into play. This ruling preserves the
rights oflaw enforcement officers to
investigate illegal activity without
Miranda warnings and signals
defense attorneys to be aware that
this standard must be met before a
motion to suppress a defendant's
statements will be granted.
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